To acquire or to compete ? An entry dilemna by Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean et al.
2008/27 
 
 
■ 
 
 
To acquire, or to compete? 
An entry dilemna 
 
 
Jean J. Gabszewicz, Didier Laussel 
and Ornella Tarola 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORE 
Voie du Roman Pays 34 
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. 
Tel (32 10) 47 43 04 
Fax (32 10) 47 43 01 
E-mail: corestat-library@uclouvain.be 
http://www.uclouvain.be/en-44508.html 
CORE DISCUSSION PAPER 
2008/27 
 
To acquire, or to compete? An entry dilemma 
 
Jean J. GABSZEWICZ1, Didier LAUSSEL2  
and Ornella TAROLA 3  
 
May 2008 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we address the following question: is it more profitable, for an entrant in a differentiated 
market, to acquire an existing firm than to compete? We illustrate the answer by considering competition in 
the banking sector. 
 
Keywords: Vertical differentiation, entry, banking competition 
JEL Classification: G34, L13, L22 
                                                           
1 CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium. E-mail: jean.gabszewicz@uclouvain.be 
2 Université de la Méditerrannée, France. E-mail: Didier.laussel@univmed.fr 
3 University of Rome "La Sapienza", Italy. E-mail: ornella.tarola@fastwebnet.it 
 
This paper presents research results of the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of Attraction initiated by the Belgian 
State, Prime Minister's Office, Science Policy Programming. The scientific responsibility is assumed by the authors. 
 
1 Introduction
In this note, we analyse under which conditions a foreign bank can find prof-
itable to enter a local market where customers face switching costs when moving
from a domestic bank to a new provider. When an individual is planning to
acquire a house, he/she can hesitate between either to buy an already built one,
or invest in the building of a new one. An analogous dilemma is faced by a firm
entering in an existing market: either it can acquire a firm which already exists,
or decide to enter with a new installation. Of course, the choice effectively made
is the more profitable one. Notice however that the market structure is affected
by the result of the choice. Buying an existing firm does not affect competi-
tion in the market but simply leads to a money transfer among agents. On the
contrary, entry with a new firm directly affects the structure of the market by
increasing the number of competitors, as well as the number of varieties offered
to the consumers. Indeed, firms generally do not sell a homogeneous product.
Products and services supplied in the market are often differentiated.Then con-
sumers face a wider domain of varieties when a new product enters the market
than when the entrant simply buys a firm which was already existing before. In
particular, when these products or services can be unambiguously ranked along
some quality ladder, entry with a new product provides wider choice opportuni-
ties to consumers depending on the leveI of quality of the new product. In this
paper we address the following question: is it more profitable, for an entrant in
a vertically differentiated market, to buy an existing firm than to enter and to
compete?
This question appears as particularly pregnant in the context of banking
competition. The retail banking sector in the European Union was historically
fragmented along national lines, and market integration is far from being com-
plete. Also, it is mainly dominated by local banks which develop long-term
relationships with their customers. In spite of new delivery channels in this
sector (phone, internet, inter alia), trust and proximity turn out to be crucial,
and direct contact with customers is still the main way for a bank to gain and
satisfy clients. Indeed, customers’ satisfaction depends not only on the product
itself, but also on other variables, such as the promptness of personnel in solving
problems and the face-to-face relations which are dependent on the existence
of a wide network of branches. As banks are fully aware that winning regular
clients is the key to get commercial success, they prevent quite often their clients
from moving to other banks through the erection of switching costs, which arise
each time a customer decides to change his current provider1 .
The low level of customer mobility induced by this customer-based approach
has a significant impact on the intensity of competition2 . Due to the relevance
1These costs mainly derive from the transaction costs - arising because customers have
to fill in forms for opening a new account, closing the old one, transferring balances, setting
up payment instructions, and tying and bundling practices - which are a way to differentiate
otherwise identical products.
2 It is worth noting that entry by means of acquisition, while typically taking place in the
banking sector does not appear in other retail sectors such as food and fashion industries,
3
of personal customer-bank relationships, the entry of foreign banks turn out to
be difficult 3 .
From an inquiry conducted by the European Commission (2007) on the bal-
ance between domestic and foreign banks in the top five banks in each European
Member State, measured by gross total retail income, it emerges that the top
banks are, in most countries, domestic. While in France, Italy, Spain, Sweden
and the UK, the top five banks are all domestic, foreign banks seem to find
some room available in the New Member States. Also, the same inquiry shows
that, in the majority of Member States, annual customers’ switching rates for
current accounts are quite low and stable at 5 to 10 per cent per year.
In this note, we analyze under which conditions a foreign bank can find
profitable to enter a local market where customers face switching costs when
moving from a domestic bank to a new provider. Quite surprisingly, the link
between customers’ switching costs and bank entry has been so far neglected
by theoretical scholars working in bank competition. A huge amount of work
going back to the eighties is concerned with banks’ entry into foreign markets
(pioneering studies have been provided by Goldberg and Saunders (1981) and
Kindleberger (1983). For more recent works, see Buch (2000), Buch and Golder
(2002) and Boldt-Christmas, Jacobsen and Tschoegl (2001)). Yet, it mainly
focuses on motives for banks to enter new markets. Also, a research line on
consumers’ loyalty and bank performance has been developed. This line allows
to clarify how building up profitable relations with group of loyal consumers can
determine a competitive advantage for banks (Levesque and McDougall (1996),
Reichheld, (1993)). While contributing to disentangle the main characteristics
of the banking sector, this research line is primarily concerned with the origin
and sources of switching costs.
In the formal model we introduce hereafter, we assume that the local market
initially consists of two domestic banks, providing financial products of different
quality, say high and low quality. The high-quality bank has a widespread
network and offers a full range of services to the clients, while the low quality
bank has a smaller number of branches and the range of products is limited
to a more restricted set of services. Then, a foreign bank decides to enter this
local market. This bank can either acquire one of the existing banks, or enter
while keeping its own brand and, thus, directly competing with the existing
rivals. In the first case, the foreign bank enters the market by acquiring one of
the existing banks, either the high quality or the low quality one. In this first
scenario, the foreign bank is not penalized by the existence of switching costs.
Yet, it has to pay a cost of acquisition which can still make entry unprofitable.
where switching costs play amost no role.
3As local banks strengthen consumers’ loyalty by means of switching costs, a foreign bank
acquiring local retail providers can take advantage of regular clients and thus increase the
chance to survive in this new environment. " Several comments submitted by banks in the
context of the public consultation stated that entry mainly occurs by means of acquiring an
existing customer base with a branch network and possibly an established brand", European
Commission, 16, (2007). Recent examples of this entry mode are provided by.Santander in
Portugal, BNP-Paribas in Italy, Fortis in Netherlands....
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In the alternative case, it can offer only services whose perceived quality is lower
than the effective one, due to the existence of switching costs. As a consequence,
even when the effective quality of its services is at the top of the quality ladder,
it is perceived as if it would be lower than the one provided by the high quality
local bank. The entry dilemma is: what strategy to select, to acquire, or to
compete?
Using a vertically differentiated model, we show first that the foreign bank
always gets a non positive profit at equilibrium when the magnitude of switch-
ing costs is so high that it can only offer services whose quality is at the bottom
of the existing quality ladder. When switching costs are not so significant to
prevent entry, then, only two profitable options remain: either it can enter with
an intermediate quality level, or it has to acquire one of the existing banks.
We illustrate in a non cooperative sequential entry/acquisition game when one
choice is more profitable than the other, depending on the value of the acquisi-
tion price.
2 Two national banks
Assume that in a covered market there are two national banks, say H and
L, providing differentiated services to the customers. Services of bank H are
unanimously ranked of being of a higher quality than those of bank L. The
average cost with respect to quality is assumed to be constant and, without loss
of generality, we set it equal to zero.
Consumers are identified by the parameter θ ∈ [a, b] , 0 ≤ a < b and uni-
formly distributed with density equal to 1. Utility of consumer θ is given by
u
i
(θ, pi) = θui − pi , i = H,L,
where uH > uL and pi is equal to the price that customers pay for getting the
whole bundle of services provided by bank i. Furthermore, assume that
a
b
∈
[
1
4
,
1
2
]
. (1)
As it will be seen later, this assumption guarantees that exactly two firms
can make strictly positive profits at an interior equilibrium. Denote by θ¯ the
consumer who is indifferent between being served by banks H and L at prices
pH and pL, respectively. Solving in θ the equation
θuH − pH = θuL − pL,
we obtain
θ¯ =
pH − pL
uH − uL
.
Then, demand functions to bank H and L are given, respectively, by
DH(pH , pL) = b−
pH − pL
uH − uL
DL(pH , pL) =
pH − pL
uH − uL
− a,
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so that profit functions ΠH(pH , pL) and ΠL(pH , pL) write as
ΠH(pH , pL) =
(
b− pH − pL
uH − uL
)
pH (2)
ΠL(pH , pL) = (
pH − pL
uH − uL
− a)pL. (3)
Maximization of (2) and (3) with respect to pH and pL, respectively, gives the
equilibrium prices p
◦
H
and p
◦
L
, namely,
p
◦
H =
(2b− a) (uH − uL)
3
.
p
◦
L
=
(b− 2a) (uH − uL)
3
.
Notice that (1) guarrantees that both equilibrium prices and profits are strictly
positive and that the market is indeed covered. Substituting these prices in (2)
and (3), respectively, we obtain that profits Π
◦
H
and Π
◦
L
at equilibrium are given
by
Π
◦
H
(
p
◦
H , p
◦
L
)
=
(uH − uL) (2b− a)2
9 (b− a)
Π
◦
L
(
p
◦
H
, p
◦
L
)
=
(uH − uL) (b− 2a)2
9 (b− a) .
3 Competition between foreign and national banks
We assume now that a foreign bank decides to enter the national market. When
entering the market, this foreign bank can either acquire one of the national
banks, or compete with them. In order to derive the optimal choice, we define
a non cooperative sequential entry/acquisition game in the following way: the
foreign firm F offers to buy the highest quality firm at some price PH ; if bank
H turns down this offer, the foreign bank offers to buy bank L at some price
PL; if bank L turns down its offer, the foreign bank enters the market
4 .
When entering the market, two cases may arise depending on whether the
foreign bank enters the market with a quality lying at the bottom of the quality
ladder, or between the top and the bottom, namely
Case (i): uH > uL > uF
Case (ii): uH > uF > uL.
In both these cases, the foreign bank provides a service whose quality is
assumed to be given by uF = uH − s, s < ui, i = H,F,L, s representing the
4Of course, we could have as well considered the alternative timing in which the foreign
bank starts to offer to buy the low quality, and then the high quality one, in the case when
bank L turns down the offer. However, restricting our analysis to this specific sequential game
does not alter the main conclusions of our work.
6
switching cost incurred by consumers if they decide to move from a national
bank to the foreign one. We start analysing when the third scenario, direct
competition, can take place in the market, namely when there is room left to
the foreign bank at equilibrium, depending on the magnitude of the switching
costs.
3.1 Equilibrium analysis in case (i): uH > uL > uF = uH−s.
In this scenario, the consumer θH indifferent between being served by bank H
or L at prices pH and pL, respectively, writes as
θH =
pH − pL
uH − uL
,
while the consumer θL indifferent between buying services provided by bank L
or F at prices pL and pF
θL =
pL − pF
uL − uF
,
Accordingly, the corresponding demand functions DH(pH , pL) and DL(pH , pL)
for the national banks H and L, respectively, are
DH(pH , pL) = b−
pH − pL
uH − uL
DL(pH , pL) =
pH − pL
uH − uL
− pL − pF
uL − uF
,
and
DF (pL, pF ) =
pL − pF
uL − uF
− a,
for the foreign bank F . Thus, the respective profits functions write as
ΠH = pH(b−
pH − pL
uH − uL
)
ΠL = pL(
pH − pL
uH − uL
− pL − pF
uL − uF
)
ΠF = pF (
pL − pF
uL − uF
− a)
From the first order conditions, it is easy to identify the following best reply
functions
pH =
1
2
b (uH − uL) +
1
2
pL
pL =
(pH(uL − uF ) + pF (uH − uL))
2(uH − uF )
pF =
(pL + a (uF − uL))
2
.
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Thus, solving the above system, we easily derive the candidate equilibrium prices
p˜H, p˜L and p˜F :
p˜H =
(uH − uL)((a− 4b)uF + 3buH + (b− a)uL)
6(uH − uF )
p˜L =
(uH − uL)(b− a)(uL − uF )
3(uH − uF )
p˜F =
(uL − uF )(3auF + (b− 4a)uH + (a− b)uL)
6(uH − uF )
Notice however that (1) implies
a
b
≥ uH − uL
4uH − 3uF − uL
, (4)
which, in turn, implies that
(3auF + (b− 4a)uH + (a− b)uL)
6(uH − uF )
≤ 0
or, equivalently, p˜F ≤ 0. Accordingly, when (1) is satisfied, then the equilibrium
value of pF = 0. In that case, the value of best replies of banks H and L have
to be computed against pF = 0, namely,
pH =
1
2
b (uH − uL) +
1
2
pL
pL =
(pH(uL − uF ))
2(uH − uF )
.
Solving this system in pH and pL, we get the equilibrium prices p
∗
H
, p∗
L
and p∗
F
,
namely,
p∗
H
=
2b(uH − uF )(uH − uL)
4uH − uL − 3uF
p∗
L
=
b(uH − uL)(uL − uF )
4uH − uL − 3uF
p∗
F
= 0.
Given that uF = uH − s, these equilibrium prices can be rewritten as
p∗H = 2bs
uH − uL
s+ 3uH − 3uL
p∗L = b (uH − uL)
s− uH + uL
s+ 3uH − 3uL
p∗F = 0
Finally, profits at equilibrium write as follows
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Π∗H(p
∗
H , p
∗
L, p
∗
F ) =
4b2(uH − uF )2(uH − uL)
(b− a) (4uH − uL − 3uF )2
Π∗L(p
∗
H , p
∗
L, p
∗
F ) =
b2(uH − uF )(uH − uL)(uL − uF )
(b− a) (4uH − uL − 3uF )2
Π∗F (p
∗
H , p
∗
L, p
∗
F ) = 0
The following proposition summarizes the above findings.
Proposition 1 When the switching cost s is so high that uH > uL > uF =
uH − s, there is no room in the market left at equilibrium to the foreign bank.
3.2 Equilibrium analysis in case (ii): uH > uF = uH−s > uL.
Now assume that the switching cost s satisfies: uH > uF = uH−s > uL. Denote
by θ¯
H
the consumer who is indifferent between being served by banks H and F
at prices pH and pF respectively. Solving the equality
uHθ − pH = uF θ − pF ,
we find that
θ¯
H
=
pH − pF
uH − uF
.
Similarly, denote by θ¯
F
indifferent between buying services provided by bank F
or L at prices pF and pL
θ¯
F
=
pF − pL
uF − uL
,
Accordingly, the corresponding demand functionsDH(pH , pL) andDL(pH , pL)
for the national banks H and L, respectively, are
DH(pH , pL) = b−
pH − pF
uH − uF
DL(pH , pL) =
pF − pL
uF − uL
− a,
and
DF (pL, pF ) =
pH − pF
uH − uF
− pF − pL
uF − uL
,
for the national bank. Thus, the respective profits functions are:
ΠH = pH(b−
pH − pF
uH − uF
)
ΠF = pF (
pH − pF
uH − uF
− pF − pL
uF − uL
)
ΠL = pL(
pF − pL
uF − uL
− a)
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From the first order conditions, it is easy to identify the following best reply
functions
pH =
1
2
pF +
b
2
(uH − uF )
pF =
(pH(uF − uL) + pL(uH − uF ))
2(uH − uL)
pL =
(pF + a (uL − uF ))
2
.
Then, solving the above system, we compute the candidate equilibrium prices
p˘H, p˘L and p˘F , namely
p˘H =
(auF − buF − 3buH − auL + 4buL) (uH − uF )
6 (uL − uH)
p˘F =
(b− a) (uL − uF ) (uH − uF )
3 (uL − uH)
p˘L =
(auF − buF − 4auH + buH + 3auL) (uL − uF )
6 (uL − uH)
.
Just repeating the argument developed in the previous section, these can-
didates are not equilibrium prices. Accordingly, it follows from above that the
value of best replies of banks H and F have to be computed against pL = 0,
namely,
pH =
1
2
pF +
b
2
(uH − uF )
pF =
(pH(uF − uL))
2(uH − uL)
pL = 0
Thus, solving this system in pH and pF , we get the equilibrium prices p
∗∗
H
,
p∗∗
L
and p∗∗
F
, namely
p∗∗
H
=
2b (uH − uF ) (uH − uL)
(4uH − uF − 3uL)
=
2sb (uH − uL)
3uH − 3uL + s
p∗∗F =
b (uF − uL) (uH − uF )
(4uH − uF − 3uL)
=
sb (uH − s− uL)
3uH − 3uL + s
p∗∗
L
= 0,
leading to equilibrium profits
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Π∗∗H (p
∗∗
H , p
∗∗
F , p
∗∗
L ) =
4b2 (uH − uF ) (uL − uH)2
(b− a) (3uL − 4uH + uF )2
=
4sb2 (uL − uH)2
(b− a) (3uL − 3uH − s)2
Π∗∗
F
(p∗∗
H
, p∗∗
F
, p∗∗
L
) =
b2 (uH − uL) (uL − uF ) (uF − uH)
(b− a) (3uL − 4uH + uF )2
=
b2 (uH − uL) (uH − s− uL) s
(b− a) (3uL − 3uH − s)2
Π∗∗L (p
∗∗
H , p
∗∗
F , p
∗∗
L ) = 0,
We summarize the above result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When the switching cost s satisfies : uH > uF = uH − s > uL,
the foreign bank can successfully enters the market at equilibrium. However, the
local bank providing the service whose quality lies at the bottom of the quality
ladder is pushed away from the market.
4 The optimal entry
We are now in a position to characterize the optimal entry-choice for the foreign
bank. The available options are: (a) to acquire a national bank (either the high
quality bank or the low quality one) and thus to pay the cost of acquisition
of the local bank without incurring switching costs; (b) to compete with the
existing banks without paying the cost of acquisition and supply services whose
quality lies, according to the previous section, between the top and the bottom
qualities of the national banks, due to the switching costs.
Payoffs of the foreign bank when it decides to acquire rather than to compete,
are assumed to obtain as an outcome of the following non cooperative sequential
entry/acquisition game which develops as follows:
1. the foreign firm F offers to buy the highest quality firm at some price
PH (notice that PH equals 0 if the foreign bank does not really want to
acquire bank H);
2. if bank H turns down this offer, the foreign bank offers to buy bank L at
some price PL (which can be 0 if the foreign bank prefers to enter rather
than to buy);
3. if bank L turns down its offer, the foreign bank enters the market only
when there is room for it (i.e. when uH > uF > uL)
The game is solved backward in the case uH > uF > uL
5 . Let us first
consider the possible acquisition of bank L by the foreign bank. Bank L would
accept to sell out whenever offered a price PL at least equal to the profits it
5 In the opposite case, it is straightforward to show that the foreign bank can never compete
nor acquire profitably.
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would get, conditional on turning down the proposal, namely PL = 0.We know
from the previous section, that entry would yield to bank F profits equal to
(uH − uL) b2 (uH − s− uL) s
(b− a) (3uL − 3uH − s)2
,
which are maximum at s = 37(uh − uL)6 , while acquiring bank L at price 0
would give it the duopoly profits
(uH − uL) (b− 2a)2
9 (b− a) .
Let us denote by ∆ the value uH − uL and define x by x = ab . The sign of the
difference between profits from entry and profits from acquiring Firm L has the
same sign as the expression
s(∆− s)
(3∆ + s)2
− 1
9
(1− 2x)2, (5)
given that we have assumed x ∈
[
1
4 ,
1
2
]
, in order to ensure that two, and only
two, firms can make positive profits in this market. Denote by s− and s+ the
roots of the second-order polynomial
P (s) = s2(−10 + 4x− 4x2) + s∆(−24x2 + 24x+ 3) +∆2(−36x2 + 36x− 9).
Lemma 3 (i) whenever x ∈ [14 , 12 −
√
3
8 ] the foreign firm F prefers to buy firm
L whatever the value of s;
(ii) when x ∈ ( 12 −
√
3
8 ,
1
2 ] the foreign firm F chooses to buy firm L whenever
s ∈ [0, s−) or s ∈ (s+,∆] and to enter whenever s ∈ (s−, s+). It is indifferent
between the two options when s = s− or s = s+.
Proof. It is sufficient to notice that (i) the sign of P (s) is the sign of (5) ,
(ii) P (s) is strictly negative for all s whenever 64x2 − 64x + 13 > 0 ⇔ x ∈
[14 ,
1
2 −
√
3
8 ], (ii) P (s) has two roots s
− = ∆(
1+8x−8x2−
√
−(64x2−64x+13)
20−8x+8x2 ) and
s+ = ∆(
1+8x−8x2+
√
−(64x2−64x+13)
20−8x+8x2 ).
Below we have plotted s−/∆ and s+/∆ as functions of x.Notice that the
interval of values of s such that entry is a better strategy than acquiring firm L
increases as x increases.
The results of Lemma 3 are rather intuitive. It is better to buy the lower
quality bank rather than to enter when (i) the consumers’ types range [a, b] is
such that a/b is sufficiently small and (ii) even when a/b is large, when the
quality of the foreign firm is not very different from the quality of one of the
two existing national banks. This is simply because in both cases, competition
between the entrant and one, or both, of the incumbents would be fierce, and
lead accordingly to low entrant’s profits. We can summarize the above results
as follows.
6The intuition is simply that Firm F makes profits which are the larger the more different
is its quality uF from the qualities supplied by the two incumbents.
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Figure 1: s−/∆ and s+/∆ as functions of x.
Proposition 4 Entry is the second-stage best strategy for the foreign firm only
when the ratio a/b obtained from the consumers’ types range [a, b] is small and
the entrant’s quality is different enough from the incumbents’ one so as to ensure
mild competition and substantial entrant’s profits.
Let us now study the first stage of the game. By acquiring firmH, the foreign
bank would earn profits equal to (uH−uL)(2b−a)
2
9(b−a) . It would have to pay a price
PH equal to the profits of bank H, if it turns down F ’s offer. Of course, the
value of this price depends on what is F ’ s best strategy, as defined in Lemma
3, when its offer to H is turned down. When F ’s strategy is to buy bank L,
then the acquisition price PH is equal to bank H’ s duopoly profits, namely
PH =
(uH−uL)(2b−a)2
9(b−a) . Accordingly, the foreign bank would earn zero profits
from the acquisition of bank H, whereas it obtains strictly positive profits from
acquiring bank L. When the F ’s best strategy is to enter the market, then
the acquisition price PH must be equal to H’s profit conditional on F ’s entry,
namely PH =
4sb2(uL−uH)2
(b−a)(3uL−3uH−s)2 . Thus, F ’s profits when acquiring H, equal
to (uH−uL)(2b−a)
2
9(b−a) −
4sb2(uL−uH)2
(b−a)(3uL−3uH−s)2 , have to be compared with its post-
entry profits, namely b
2(uH−uL)(uH−s−uL)s
(b−a)(3uL−3uH−s)2 .The sign of the difference between
the former and the latter is the same as the sign of
b2s(∆− s)
(3∆ + s)2
− (2b− a)
2
9
+
4sb2∆
(3∆+ s)2
which is itself the same as the sign of the second order polynomial
( s
∆
)2
(−x2 + 4x− 13) + 3
( s
∆
)
(−2x2 + 8x+ 7)− 9(x− 2)2.
Simple calculations reveal that this second-order polynomial is always negative
in the range of admissible values ( s∆ ∈ [0, 1] , x ∈
[
1
4 ,
1
2
]
). This shows that, in
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the first stage game, the foreign firm F always prefers to acquire firm H rather
than to compete.
Proposition 5 When the ratio a/b obtained from the consumers’ types range
is small or when it is large but F ’s quality is not very different from H’s or L’s,
then the foreign bank acquires the low quality firm. When the ratio a/b is large
and F ’s quality differs substantially from H’s and L’s so as to make entry a
credible threat, the foreign bank acquires the high quality bank H7 .
5 Conclusion
In this note we have completely clarified the entry dilemma under vertically
differentiated competition: is it more profitable to buy an existing firm than to
compete directly with incumbents? First, when the switching cost incurred by
consumers is so high that the foreign bank can contemplate to enter only with
the lowest quality, there is no room left for entry. On the contrary, when the
switching cost is less significant, the potential entrant is able to enter with an
intermediate quality and compete with the incumbents. However, entering the
market is never an equilibrium strategy for the foreign firm. In any case, notice
that, the quality ladder finally proposed to the consumers is identical, ex-ante
and ex-post.
Of course, the simplicity of our conclusions relies on the specific structure
which is used to model banking competition. It is well known that, under vertical
product differentiation, there is an upperbound on the number of products which
can survive at equilibrium (Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980), Shaked and Sutton
(1983)). This property also relies on the fact that we have assumed a constant
average cost with respect to quality; the conclusions about entry could be more
difficult to derive if quality costs would not be assumed to be linear.
There is still room for providing many further microeconomic insights into
the problem of banking competition. For instance, in order to embed spatial
competition among banks, the model could be enriched if it would be combined
with some elements borrowed from horizontal differentiation. For example, some
consumers could prefer a bank located close to their own location than another
one even providing better services, simply because this higher quality does not
compensate for the higher transportation costs incurred when moving to this
other bank. Solving this problem would require a framework combining elements
borrowed from both vertically and horizontally differentiated models. More
generally, the implications of entry by acquisition on competition constitutes an
open field for future research which has only been superficially scratched in the
present essay.
7As stated in footnote 4, even in the alternative timing in which the foreign bank starts
to offer to buy the low quality, and then the high quality one, in the case when bank L turns
down the offer, it could be proved that entering the market is never an equilibrium strategy
for the foreign bank and thus F always buy bank H.
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